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COMMENTS
"NEWER" EQUAL PROTECTION: THE IMPACT OF THE
MEANS-FOCUSED MODEL
INTRODUCTION

The concepts of "old" and "new" equal protection are familiar
to observers of constitutional law. Old equal protection connotes "minimal rationality," while new equal protection stands for "strict
scrutiny." In most instances a legislative classification is subjected to
the old criterion. Under this doctrine a classification will not be invalidated if any reasonable state of facts may be conceived to justify
it.1 However, where a "suspect classification ' 2 or a "fundamental interest"'3 is involved the new test is applied, and the statutory discrimination will be voided unless the state can demonstrate the existence
of a "compelling interest." Invariably, selection of the standard dictates the result which follows: minimal rationality sustains the classification; strict scrutiny nullifies the classification. Thus, the important
question in any equal protection decision is which test should the
court invoke.
In his 1972 article in the Harvard Law Review, Gerald Gunther
described the emergence of a third standard.4 He noted that this doctrine, called "newer" equal protection, derives from several cases decided by the Supreme Court during its 1971 term. 5 According to
1. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
2. The following have been identified as suspect classifications: alienage, illegitimacy, indigency, and national origin. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1311 & nn.4-7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).

3. The following have been identified as fundamental interests: the right to vote,
the right to procreate, rights with respect to criminal procedure, first amendment
rights, and the right to travel interstate. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1127-28 (1969). See also San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1311 n.8 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAgv. L.
REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
5. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
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Reed v. Reed, 6 the most important of those opinions, this standard
is satisfied when a statutory classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary,
and [rests] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."'7 Although this language seems to suggest the application of old equal protection, 8 it
produces results more consistent with new equal protection whereby
statutes are often declared unconstitutional. 9 Gunther characterizes
this criterion of review as the "means-focused" model' since it is concerned solely with the means by which the legislature furthers its
goals, not the goals themselves. 1 Unlike old equal protection, the
Court evaluates the means in terms of stated legislative objectives
rather than imagining various hypothetical justifications. 12 Unlike new
equal protection, the gauge for the acceptability of the means is the
legislative purpose, not constitutional interests which are unavoidably
related to the value systems of judges.' 3 This model, in fact, bridges
the gap between new equal protection and old equal protection not
by abandoning the new but by raising the level of the old from virtual
4
abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.'
Gunther's model is summarized by the following propositions:
the model is applicable to a wide range of statutes, including most
social and economic legislation;' 5 it is most likely to be utilized in
"avoidance" situations' 6 where the court wishes to avoid discussion of
difficult issues associated with strict scrutiny;' 7 to sustain a classification under newer equal protection the means must substantially further legislative ends;' 8 significant over- or under-inclusiveness in the
classification will not be tolerated;'0 the means are measured against
6. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
7. Id. at 76, citing F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920).

8. See F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (decided
under old equal protection).
9. In all but one of the cases under discussion here the classification was invalidated.
10. Gunther 20.
11. Id at 21.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 26.
17. See id. at 29.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 20, 33.
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state purposes as set forth by an authoritative state source, 20 and all
purposes are considered whether of a primary or ancillary nature.2 '
As mentioned earlier, when a court employs the model it must not
hypothesize legislative rationales for the classification; the reasonableness of a statute is to be judged solely on the basis of materials offered
to the court.2 2 When the model is applied, the greatest difficulty is
determining the line of demarcation between value judgments involved in assessing legislative goals and those judgments involved in
evaluating the ways in which these goals are to be furthered.2 3
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate how this model has
been enlisted in subsequent court opinions. Numerous cases have relied upon the rulings of the 1971 term, but because the facts were so
similar to these rulings the appropriate standard of review is obfuscated.2 4 Similarly, many decisions cite the Reed test quoted previously,2 5
but proceed to declare that if there is any reasonable basis for the
26
classification the alleged statutory discrimination must be upheld.
Several recent suits have recognized the emergence of the means-focused model, but have refused to use it to resolve equal protection
issues.2 7 A few opinions have, however, actually acknowledged and ap29
plied the model: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre,28 Brown v. Merlo,
20. Id. at 46-47. These include the preamble to the statute, the legislative history
of the statute, and a pronouncement by a state official. Id. at 47.
21. Id. at 20, 33.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 48. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 58-59 infra.
24. See, e.g., People v. Byrnes, 7 Ill. App. 3d 735, 288 N.E.2d 690 (2d Dist.
1972); Commonwealth v. Wolenski, 449 Pa. 173, 296 A.2d 31 (1972).
25. See text accompanying note 7 supra.

26. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Katz, 73 Misc. 2d 663, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct.
1973); Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Va. 1973), citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
27. See, e.g., City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973);

Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Both of these cases recognized
a test stronger than old equal protection but weaker than new equal protection. Yet,
each refused to apply the model, opting instead for the traditional standard of review.
See also Demiragh v. Devos, 476 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973) where the court acknowledges
the model, but states that the statute would fail under new, newer, or old equal protection. Id. at 405.
28. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit contesting the constitutionality of a village
zoning ordinance which restricted occupancy of one-family residences to traditional
families or groups of not more than two unrelated individuals). The dissent in this
case also discusses the means-focused model.
29. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (suit was brought
challenging the constitutionality of California's "guest statute" which prohibited an automobile guest from recovering for injuries inflicted by his negligent host without a showing of willful misconduct or intoxication).
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Green v. Board of Education,O Schwartz v. Talmo,31 Aguayo v. Richardson,32 and Eslinger v. Thomas.33 These are the cases with which
this comment will be concerned.
HAVE THESE CASES CONFORMED TO THE MODEL?

A. The Model Is Applicable to a Wide Range of Statutes-Including
Most Social and Economic Legislation
Gunther's observation that the model can be administered to a
melange of statutes is substantiated by the six cases under consideration.3 4 The decisions deal with enactments relating to zoning,? negligence,3 6 workmen's compensation,3 7 welfare,38 maternity leaves,89 and
criteria for working as a page in a state legislature. 40 In each opinion
invocation of the model invalidated the statute, 41 with the exception
of Aguayo. However, this anomaly is to be expected. In Aguayo the
New York State Commissioner of Social Services and the State Department of Social Services initiated two experimental back-to-work projects for employable members of families receiving assistance under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. One
of them, the Public Service Work Opportunities Project (PSWOP),
included approximately 25 percent of the state's AFDC cases; while
30. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit against a resolution of the board of education which required every teacher who became pregnant to take a maternity leave
beginning at the sixth month of pregnancy).
31. 295 Minn. 356, 364, 205 N.W.2d 318, 324 (1973) (MacLaughlin, J., dissenting) (challenge to an amendment to Minnesota's workmen's compensation statute which
denied compensation for suicide even though causally related to employment).
32. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973) (action filed contesting the constitutionality
of requiring only a small percentage of the state's AFDC recipients to participate in
back-to-work programs).
33. 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973) (challenge of a resolution of the South Carolina
Senate which prohibited the employment of women as pages).
34. While all of these opinions deal with so-called "social and economic" legislation, none of them represents a return to the discarded notions of substantive due
process. That is, they do not seriously interfere with the states' power to legislate
against injurious business and commercial practices. See Gunther 24. See generally Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-37 (1949).
35. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
36. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
37. Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973).
38. Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. Green v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).
41. In the Schwartz case the statute was sustained, but the dissenting judge, who
applied the model, voted to void the statute.
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the other, the Incentives for Independence (IFI), covered about 2.5
percent of AFDC and Home Relief cases. Gunther would assert that
the model should not be applied to this type of legislation, since determining the rationality of the means here is not a judicially manageable question: the legislature could have responded to the problem
of a rising welfare caseload in a number of ways, with any allocation
decision as reasonable as any other.4 As a matter of fact, the Aguayo
court was uncertain as to whether newer equal protection or old equal
protection was applicable, and held that the program was constitu43
tional regardless of which standard governed.
B. The Model Will Most Likely Be Employed in "Avoidance"
Situations
As cited above, a court should opt for the means-focused model
44
to avoid discussion of perplexing issues associated with strict scrutiny.
Pressures for avoidance arise wherever employment of the new equal
protection standard requires the court to make choices in an uncharted
area of the law. 45 Gunther states that, of the cases decided during the
1971 term, Eisenstadt v. Baird8 and Reed v. Reed 47 are the best examples of the avoidance technique. 48 In Eisenstadt there was an attempt
to "expand the boundaries of the amorphous right of privacy"49
of Griswold v. Connecticut," while in Reed the Court was urged to
declare sex a suspect classification for purposes of invoking new equal
protection.5 1 Neither of these questions was reached, however, since
resort to the model nullified each statute.52 The influence of avoidance
predominated in these two decisions because the issues shunned were
complex, value-laden, and would have pushed the Court into new
53
areas of the law.
42. Gunther 24. The only other situation where the model should not be applied
to social and economic legislation arises when the data are exceedingly technical and

complex. Id.
43. 473 F.2d at 1109-10.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
See Gunther 26.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
404 U.S. 71 (1972).
Gunther 29-30.
Id. at 29 & n.139.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Gunther 29 & n.138.
See id. at 30.
Id. at 29.
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Turning now to the Boraas case, it is apparent that the model
was employed to avoid discussion of the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance which denied occupancy of one-family dwellings to more
than two unrelated persons:
Fortunately we do not have to decide whether there has been an
infringement of the right of privacy or travel because we believe
that we are no longer limited to the either-or choice between the
compelling state interest test and the minimum scrutiny [test] .... A4
Similarly, avoidance pressures are evident in Brown, where there
was a challenge to California's guest statute. Here the use of strict
scrutiny would have demanded a holding that a discrimination against
automobile guests is a suspect classification or the right to sue for negligently inflicted injuries is a fundamental right. Making either of these
judgments would have constituted a considerable departure from prevailing doctrine, but application of the model avoids these difficult
questions.
In the Green and Eslinger cases utilization of strict scrutiny would
have required a declaration that sex is a suspect classification. Since
the Supreme Court failed to do this in Reed, lower courts may not
rely on a new equal protection argument to condemn a classification
based upon sex. Hence the courts in these cases were practically compelled to shun discussion of the strict scrutiny standard.
It should be mentioned that in Green the other branch of strict
scrutiny could easily have been invoked based on a prior Supreme
Court ruling which regarded the right to work at one's chosen occupation as fundamental.5 6 One might wonder, then, why the court would
prefer the model to new equal protection. Perhaps, being aware of
the Reed decision, it felt obligated to employ the means test. In any
event, since use of strict scrutiny would not have presented a problem, avoidance played no part in this aspect of the opinion.
Avoidance pressures were much stronger in the Schwartz dissenting opinion. The statute denied compensation for suicide resulting
from employment injuries, therefore resort to new equal protection
would have required the identification of a right to recover under
workmen's compensation as fundamental or the treatment of injured
54.
55.
notes 2-3
56.

476 F.2d at 814.
For an indication of how the two categories would have to be expanded, see
supra.
Truax v. Rach, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

670
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employees who commit suicide as a suspect classification. There are
no precedents for either conclusion, so Judge MacLaughlin would
have been forced to construct a difficult and controversial argument.
Instead, he employed Gunther's model and voted to invalidate the
statute.
Finally, one must ask whether newer equal protection was applied
to the welfare situation in Aguayo due to the appeal of avoidance.
Since minimal rationality was the alternative review standard here, it
is clear that the model was not invoked to avoid consideration of the
issues associated with strict scrutiny. Apparently, the court discussed
application of the newer equal protection because it feared that meansscrutiny might have replaced old equal protection. 5 7 Regardless of
which standard governed, the court stated that the result would be the
same.58 Hence Aguayo, and perhaps Green, are the only decisions
where "avoidance" pressures were not at work.
C. Legislative Means Must Substantially FurtherLegislative Ends
This is the basic requirement of the model. Unlike old equal
protection, a mere rational relationship between means and ends will
not suffice. But contrary to new equal protection, the court is not
concerned with the nature of the ends. The sole inquiry is whether
the means substantially further these ends.
In Boraas the court of appeals questioned the legitimacy of the
zoning ordinance's purpose as articulated by the district court-protection and maintenance of the "traditional family pattern." 59 However, it later assumed arguendo that this constituted a valid purpose and
stated that it could not find a "shred of rational support" for the means
which were employed to accomplish this objective. 06 Such strong language, coupled with the court's suspicion of the zoning ordinance,
indicates that the analysis was not confined to a discussion of means.
The court failed to distinguish between narrow value judgments involved in evaluating means and broad value judgments involved in
choosing among ends-a difficulty which Gunther foresaw. 61
57. 473 F.2d at 1109.

58. Id.
59. 476 F.2d at 815.
60. Id. at 816.
61. See note 23 supra.
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Similarly, although the court in Brown demonstrated that, in
1973, the state purpose of protecting hospitality has little merit,

2

it

accepted the validity of this interest and of the interest in preventing
collusive lawsuits.63 The court then proceeded to determine whether
or not the classification (barring recovery for injuries inflicted by a
negligent driver-host) substantially furthers these objectives. Hence, it
can be said that its inquiry was restricted to the narrow value judgments involved in a means-oriented test, and thus conformed extremely
well to the basic requirement of the model.
The resolution in Green requiring a teacher to take a maternity
leave beginning at the fifth month of pregnancy was examined in rela04
tion to the state purposes articulated in the lower court opinion.
There was a hint of value judgment by the court when it stated that
only two of the purposes (continuity of classroom education and administrative convenience) were "substantial." 65 Nevertheless, as in
Brown, the means test in this case parallels the model quite closely.
In Schwartz the dissenting judge argued that the legislative goal
of easing administrative burdens did not warrant denial of recovery
for employment-caused suicide.6 6 The administrative responsibilities
of obtaining adequate proof of suicide and of holding a hearing
07
should have been dealt with directly, not by flatly barring recovery.
However, he went on to suggest that if another legislative justification could be found, the classification would be sustained.08 From this
remark one can conclude that the judge was more concerned with
legislative ends (the state's purposes) than with legislative means. He
too encountered difficulty in restricting the relevant scrutiny to a
narrow evaluation of means.
In the remaining two cases, Eslinger and Aguayo, there was close
conformity with the model. In applying the Reed test, the court in
Eslinger found no "fair and substantial" relation between the object
of the resolution (combatting the appearance of impropriety which
62. 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397. Formerly, an injured guest's lawsuit against his host might have been characterized as an act of "ingratitude" and thus detrimental to hospitality. However, in an era in which nearly all
automobile drivers have liability insurance, there is no "ingratitude" in suing your host's
insurer. Id.
63. Id. at 864, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
64. 473 F.2d at 634. See text accompanying notes 76 & 83 infra.
65. Id. at 635.
66. 295 Minn. at 365-66, 205 N.W.2d at 325-26 (MacLaughlin, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 366, 205 N.W.2d at 326.
68. Id.
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might flow from the employment of female pages) and the ground of
difference (sex) upon which the classification rested.69 The court
demonstrated the fallacy of basing this classification upon sex, and
made no attempt to question the merit of the legislature's concern
with its public image. Thus, it focused entirely on the appropriateness of the chosen means. Similarly, in Aguayo the court decided that
the state's goal (making improvements in the welfare system) was
"suitably furthered" 70 by the experimental back-to-work program.
There was a brief hint of value judgment on the part of the court
when it stated that this purpose is as legitimate as any other possible
state purpose. 7 1 Thus Aguayo, like every other case but Eslinger,
demonstrates that the model is seldom employed in its "pure" form.
Courts have considerable trouble in limiting their analysis solely to a
discussion of means.
D. The Court Is Unwilling To Imagine Legislative Justifications:
Means are Measured Against All Purposes Asserted by the State
The court in Boraas examined all of the purposes asserted by
the village in support of the zoning ordinance:7 2 (1) protection and
maintenance of the prevailing family pattern, (2) control of population
density, (3) escalation of rental rates, (4) control of congestion and
noise, and (5) stability of the community. Since the majority believed
that a court is required to determine whether the legislative classification in fact has a substantial relationship to a lawful objective, 73 it did
not imagine any justification whatsoever.
In Brown California alleged that the guest statute promoted two
state interests: the protection of hospitality and the elimination of
collusive law suits.7 4 The California Supreme Court dealt with both
of these aims,75 but explicitly refused to hypothesize any legislative
rationales of its own:
Although by straining our imagination we could possibly derive a
theoretically "conceivable," but totally unrealistic, state purpose that
69. 476 F.2d at 232.
70. 473 F.2d at 1109, citing Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972).

71. Id.

72. 476 F.2d at 815-17.
73. Id. at 815 n.8.
74. 8 Cal. 3d at 859, 506 P.2d at 214, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 390.

75. Id.
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might support this classification scheme, we do not believe our constitutional adjudicatory function should be governed by such a highly
fictional approach to statutory purpose .... [W]e believe that it would

be inappropriate to rely on a totally unrealistic "conceivable" purpose
to sustain the present statute in the face of our state constitutional
guarantees. 76
In Green the court was uncertain as to whether the board of education had identified or articulated any legitimate state purpose in
support of the maternity leave rule. 77 It did discuss the justifications
offered by the district court judge-continuity of education, administrative convenience, and health and safety of the teacher and her unborn child 78 -but refused to offer any of its own. In Schwartz the dissent considered only the legislative purpose of easing administrative
burdens.7 9 Judge MacLaughlin made no reasonable attempt to ascertain or imagine alternative justifications; in one sentence he stated that
he could find no other rationale to support the classification.8" Similarly, in Eslinger the court made no effort to look beyond the single
state interest in protecting its public image. In Aguayo there was no
need to examine alternatives because the legislative purpose of improving the state's welfare system was regarded as "suitable." 81 In
virtually every opinion, then, the court examined all the purposes
which were laid before it, but refused to conjecture about any additional possibilities.
E. Significant Over- or Under-Inclusiveness in the Classification Will
Not Be Tolerated
An under-inclusive classification has been described as one in
which all those who possess a specific trait have the mischief at which
the classification is directed, but some of those who have the mischief
do not possess the trait.8 2 The classification is under-inclusive because
it does not include many whom it should include. Conversely, an
76. Id. at 865-66 n.7, 506 P.2d at 219-20 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96 n.7

(citation omitted).
77. 473 F.2d at 634.
78. Id. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
79. 295 Minn. at 365-66, 205 N.W.2d at 325-26 (MacLaughlin, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 366, 205 N.W.2d at 326.
81. 473 F.2d at 1109.
82. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv.
341, 347-48 (1949).
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over-inclusive classification is one in which all those who have the mischief possess the trait, but some of those who possess the trait do not

have the mischief.83 The classification is over-inclusive because it contains many whom it should not contain.
Strict scrutiny and means-scrutiny are both equally harsh on
under- and over-inclusive classifications; they differ only in the absolute number of statutes invalidated (since newer equal protection is
a less rigorous standard of review). As a result, the inquiry here is
the extent to which the model is less tolerant of under- and overinclusiveness than is old equal protection. Since newer equal protection subjects the classification to a more careful scrutiny, and since
old equal protection defers to under-inclusive classifications, 84 one
would expect under-inclusive classifications to encounter increased
resistance under the model. Over-inclusive classifications may also be
more difficult to sustain, but on balance the model should have a
greater effect on under-inclusive classifications. This prediction is
substantiated by the six opinions.
The Boraas case involves aspects of both over- and under-inclusiveness. With respect to controlling population density, the zoning
ordinance is under-inclusive since the size of families is not limited.
Many of those who have the mischief (potential for increasing population within a household) do not possess the trait (of being one of
three or more unrelated persons living together under the same roof) .
If, however, one accepts the proposition that families are "self-limiting" in size, then the classification is over-inclusive. Some of those who
possess the trait do not possess the mischief-because there is no mischief as long as the average size of an unrelated household is less
than or equal to the average size of a traditional family. Assuming that
the median family size is near four persons, this same number of unrelated individuals should be permitted to live together; otherwise
the classification is over-inclusive. With respect to the escalation of
rent prices, the statute is under-inclusive because it does not embrace
families with high incomes. Many of those who have the mischief (of
exerting a greater demand on rents) do not have the trait of being
among three or more unrelated individuals. On the other hand, some
of those who possess the trait do not have the ability to place upward
pressure on rents, so the classification is over-inclusive as to them.
83. Id. at 347, 351.
84. Id. at 351. See note 87 infra & accompanying text.
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Finally, regarding possible congestion and noise problems, the classification is again both under- and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive
because it makes no attempt to limit the number of cars owned or
the amount of noise produced by a family. It is over-inclusive because
not all unrelated individuals living in groups of three or more will
own an automobile or generate additional noise.
The Brown decision also has aspects of over- and under-inclusiveness. The classification is over-inclusive since auto guests are prevented
from recovering for negligently inflicted injuries by their host simply because a small number of such guests may file collusive lawsuits.
In other words, many of those who possess the trait (automobile
guest) do not have the mischief (potential for collusion). At the same
time, the classification is under-inclusive because non-guests are not
prohibited from colluding even though the likelihood of fraud is
equally great. Some of those who have the mischief (potential for collusion) do not possess the trait (of being an automobile guest). Underinclusiveness is evident in another connection: guests who are not
injured in a car driven by the host (i.e., a guest who is injured when
he trips on a broken tile bordering his host's swimming pool) are not
denied recovery. Here, some of those who have the mischief (insult to
hospitality) do not, however, possess the trait (of being an automobile
guest).
In Eslinger there are also elements of over- and under-inclusiveness. The classification is over-inclusive because most females who work
as pages will not harm the public image of the state legislature. To use
the familiar terms, many members of the class who possess the trait
(female sex) do not have the mischief (improper behavior). Conversely, members who might be guilty of impropriety are not included
in the classification because they are not members of the female sex.
As a result, the classification is both over- and under-inclusive.
The remaining cases apply the test of newer equal protection solely
to under-inclusive classifications. In Green the court dealt with three
such classifications, based upon the alternative interests suggested by
the district court judge. 5 First, a teacher who becomes seriously ill,
unlike the teacher who becomes pregnant, is not required to take a
mandatory leave of absence. Secondly, a pregnant instructor creates no
more administrative problems than any other sick instructor. Finally,
85. 473 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1973).
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there is no reason why a school should be concerned only with the
safety of its pregnant teachers; all instructors deserve to be protected
from classroom violence. In each of these situations it is apparent that
many members of the class who have the mischief are omitted because
they do not possess the trait of pregnancy.
The Schwartz and Aguayo opinions yield similar results. The under-inclusiveness in Schwartz is manifested by the fact that other workers who have similar problems of proof, with the concomitant need for
a hearing, are not totally barred from recovery. For example, an employee who contracts an infectious disease from a work-related injury
must demonstrate that the injury caused the disease, just as the plaintiff in Aguayo would have been required to show that the employment
accident caused the suicide. Thus, if the purpose of the prohibition
against recovery is the elimination of a hearing on questions of proof,
there is no reason to discriminate against only those employees who
commit suicide. And, the classification in Aguayo is under-inclusive
because many persons who have the mischief of "welfare cheating" are
not included in the group chosen to participate in the back-to-work
program.
Although three of the decisions involved over-inclusive categories,
every decision contained aspects of under-inclusiveness. Moreover, the
classifications in Green, Schwartz and Aguayo were solely under-inclusive. As a result, the model has had its greatest effect on under-inclusive classifications.
CONCLUSIONS

Few opinions have actually adopted newer equal protection as the
relevant standard of review. This may be due to the fact that courts
have been reluctant to recognize the emergence of the model as a
new test, or that they simply have not had many cases in which to
apply the test. Nevertheless, the six decisions illustrate that newer equal
protection can be applied to nearly all types of legislation, 6 and will
probably be employed to avoid discussion of difficult issues associated
with strict scrutiny. The cases also indicate that, unlike old equal protection, the model has a propensity to void under-inclusive classifications. Additionally, there is the likelihood that in every opinion ex86. For situations where the model should not be applied, see note 41 supra &
accompanying text.
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cept Green invocation of strict scrutiny apparently would have failed
because its requirements would not have been satisfied. 87 These two
characteristics indicate that the model served to nullify more statutes
than would have formerly been the case.
Finally, the decisions demonstrate that newer equal protection is
seldom applied in its "pure" form. Courts find it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in a narrow means-scrutiny. As a result, a "sliding
standard" of review may emerge. The inquiry in any particular case
would involve consideration of the nature of the classification (degree
of suspectness), the nature of the rights adversely affected (degree of
fundamentalness) and the nature of the state interest which is urged
in support of the classification.8 8 Minimal rationality would lie at one
end of the continuum: this standard recognizes administrative and
political limitations, and permits the legislature to adopt a "piecemeal" approach80 to those problems where the classification is not
aimed at a particular group and the right affected is not significant.
As the right affected approaches constitutional status or the classification becomes more suspect the state interest would have to increase
commensurately in order to sustain the classification. At this point under-inclusive classifications encounter much difficulty: the significance
of the right and/or the suspectness of the classification should take
precedence over the state's interest in the "piecemeal" approach. According to the court in Boraas, it is this kind of scrutiny which is appropriate where individual human rights of groups as opposed to business regulations are involved.0° Strict scrutiny would lie at the other
end of the continuum: where the classification is highly suspect (one
based upon an unalterable trait which stigmatizes the class) 91 or the
right affected is guaranteed by the Constitution. Here, of course, the
state must demonstrate that a compelling interest supports the classification.
87. This is because of the degree to which the test would have to be extended.
See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
88. See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815 n.8 (2d Cir. 1973).
89. These are the classic reasons for the courts' traditional deference to underinclusive classifications. On account of limited resources or on account of pressures
exerted by special interest groups, the legislature is allowed to attack a general problem in an imperfect way. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 82, at 349-51. The legislature is not required to postpone action until it is prepared to deal with the problem
in a comprehensive fashion.
90. 476 F.2d at 815.
91. Developments of the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1127
(1969). See also note 2 supra. But cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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COMMENTS

Whether the means-focused model serves to replace, supplement,
or obscure prior equal protection doctrines, it seems certain to provide
the courts with a flexibility which heretofore has been non-existent.
This increased adaptability on the part of the judiciary is not without
its costs: legislative freedom will suffer. But, this is a welcome development since legislatures possessed far too much latitude under old equal
protection. With the aid of Gunther's model the courts, in a meaningful sense, can serve as guarantors of the integrity of the political
process.
PosTSCRUPT

The Supreme Court decided the Boraas case on April 1, 1974.92
The Court rejected the argument that any fundamental right was
involved. 93 Instead, it characterized the case as one in which the Court
has historically respected the classification drawn by the legislature as
long as the law is reasonable, not arbitrary, 94 and bears a rational
relationship to a permissible state objective. 95 The majority was not
in the least bothered by the over- and under-inclusiveness of the
zoning ordinance, indicating that every line drawn by a legislature
excludes some who might well have been included.9 6
It is clear that, even though the Court cited the Reed case, it
applied the test of old equal protection. A reading of the opinion
indicates that this almost total deference stems from the fact that the
statute is a zoning ordinance enacted by the local community. Since
the model would subject the ordinance to much closer scrutiny, the
Court may have regarded it as inappropriate in the context of this
case. Nevertheless, since this represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has had an opportunity to review the use of the means-focused
model by a lower court, it is disappointing that the test of newer equal
protection was mentioned nowhere in the opinion.
ALAN

M.

AHART

92. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 42 U.S.L.W. 4475 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1974).

93. Id. at 4477.
94. Id., citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
95. Id., citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).

96. Id.

